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HEALING FAIR DEALING? A COMPARATIVE 
COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN FAIR DEALING 
TO UK FAIR DEALING AND US FAIR USE 
 
Giuseppina D’Agostino* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a result of the March 4, 2004 Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada1 for the first time in 
Canadian copyright history, the court determined that Canadian law must 
recognize a “user right” to carry on exceptions generally and fair dealing 
in particular. Whereas the notion of exceptions before this decision was 
premised on a narrow interpretation of the scope of the exceptions, the 
Supreme Court has raised what was a narrow exception to the level of 
general principle. Thus, it is important in the ongoing project of copyright 
policy reform to probe the meaning of this ruling since it would affect 
potential policy work on exceptions, and especially how the notion of fair 
dealing is conceived and applied.  
 
This paper proceeds in six parts. Part II examines the significance of CCH 
in rooting a user right. At this early juncture, it is useful to step back and 
revisit pre-CCH cases often seen as user unfriendly and then gaze forward 
into the post-CCH jurisprudential scene. Having set out the Canadian fair 
dealing legislative and jurisprudential landscape, the paper begins to 
explore this legal backdrop in other jurisdictions. UK fair dealing and US 
fair use are respectively examined in Parts III and IV. In discussing US 
fair use, particular attention is made to the flurry of criticism against it, 
with specific reference to the educational sector. Part V then compares the 
                                                 
* DPhil. Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto, Canada. This paper is based on a study conducted for the Department of 
Canadian Heritage, Canada, June 2007. Usual disclaimers apply. This paper is a work in 
progress and comments are welcome at gdagostino@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
1 [2004] 1 SCR 339 (“CCH”). 
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three jurisdictions. It is observed that because of CCH, the Canadian 
common law factors are more flexible than those entrenched in the US. 
For the UK, certain criteria have emerged from the caselaw consonant to 
Canada’s pre-CCH framework and in many ways there is now a hierarchy 
of factors with market considerations at the fore. The real differences, 
however, ultimately lie in the policy preoccupations held by the respective 
courts, with Canada’s top court alone concerned in championing user 
rights above all other rights.  
 
In the spirit of attaining copyright balance, some conclusions, by way of 
potential solutions, are advanced in Part VI. The main focus of this paper 
is on the applicable legislation and jurisprudence, although as will become 
apparent the solutions may (and should) also lie outside (and 
complimentary to) the realm of the law and the courts. While doing 
nothing does not seem to be the appropriate response, legal intervention 
may not be warranted either. Rather than, or at the very least together 
with, reforming the law, establishing fair dealing best practices is most 
promising. The parties directly affected in a specific industry can together 
develop these guidelines to ultimately aid in clearer and ongoing fairer fair 
dealing decision-making in the courts. It is here that US initiatives can 
serve as most fruitful to emulate.  
 
While this paper investigates the legislative and jurisprudential landscape 
of fair dealing, it recognizes that there are other matters such as the role of 
contract and technology which also affect fair dealing/fair use. As argued 
elsewhere, the role of contract in copyright law cannot be underestimated.2 
Contract law can promote and undermine fair dealing. Contracts can 
promote and undermine users and creators and any party in the copyright 
system for that matter. It is thus important to assess how the role of 
contract is embedded in the Canadian Copyright Act3 (“CCA”) and how it 
                                                 
2 The critical role of contract law in copyright law, or copyright contract is a recurring 
preoccupation of mine: G D’Agostino “Canada’s Robertson Ruling: Any Practical 
Significance for Copyright Treatment of Freelance Authors?” [2007] EIPR 66; G 
D’Agostino “Freelance Authors for Free: Globalisation of Publishing, Convergence of 
Copyright Contracts and Divergence of Judicial Reasoning” in F Macmillan (ed) New 
Directions in Copyright (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2005) 166 and G D’Agostino 
“Copyright Treatment of Freelance Work in the Digital Era” (2002) 19 Santa Clara 
Computer and High Technology LJ 37. 
3 Copyright Act RSC 1985 c C-42 (“CCA”). 
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is deployed in practice to promote and temper the desired results—
presumably the objectives of balance where the interests of creators, users, 
rights holders and the general public are considered. 
 
Moreover, the relationship between technology and fair dealing/fair use is 
equally material. Like contract, technology can also undermine and 
promote the various copyright stakeholder interests. The link between 
technology and fair dealing/fair use and other exceptions has been 
specifically examined in the US and the findings are negative.4 If fair 
dealing is to be preserved, then technologies cannot undermine its 
functioning. The CCA needs to be mindful of this dynamic. And so, while 
each of these matters are critical and will be raised throughout this paper 
where relevant, a fuller analysis is left for another time and place. Equally 
important and beyond the scope of complete analysis are the actual 
practices of stakeholders as for instance borne out in business models 
steadily evolving to embrace technology and promote the goals of easy 
and open access. The software open access movements and the Creative 
Commons are some models complementing some of the ethics of fair 
dealing.  Last, because this paper is limited to the domestic and 
comparative aspects of fair dealing, it is at this time untenable to assess the 
international dimensions of the issue. Other scholars have begun to do so.5 
For the immediate future, it does not seem as though CCH would be cause 
for concern in violating Berne’s three-step test for instance. Should the 
courts apply CCH expansively, this may trigger international scrutiny of 
the legislation. To date, there have been no such conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See text to nn 172-197. 
5 D Gervais “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) UOTLJ 315-356. 
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II. FAIR DEALING IN CANADA 
A. LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
 
In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched in the 
CCA. Since its inception, fair dealing has been twice amended.6 Section 
29 provides:  
 
“Research or Private Study” (Section 29) 
Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not 
infringe copyright. 
 
“Criticism or Review” (Section 29.1) 
Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned: 
(a) the source; and 
(b) if given in the source, the name of the 
author, in the case of a work, 
performer, in the case of a performer’s performance, 
maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal. 
 
“News Reporting” (Section 29.2) 
Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned: 
(a) the source; and 
(b) if given in the source, the name of the 
author, in the case of a work, 
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance, 
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal. 
 
                                                 
6 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act SC 1993 c 44 s 64(1) in 
force January 1, 1994, as ss 27(2) (a.1); then by an Act to amend the Copyright Act SC 
1997 c 24 s 18, in force September 1, 1997, as s 29.2 (which remains the current 
provision of the Act) 
2007] HEALING FAIR DEALING? 5 
 
 
 
Traditionally, scholars, practitioners and the courts have construed fair 
dealing as a defence to copyright infringement. To make out a defence, the 
defendant had to prove that: (1) the action fit within one of the enumerated 
purposes (eg research or private study, research or criticism and news 
reporting) (2) the action was fair and (3) in the case of the last two 
categories, there was acknowledgment of the source. Typically, the 
enumerated grounds were interpreted as exhaustive as any purpose not 
falling strictly within an enumerated ground infringed.7  However, as 
shown below, this may no longer be the case post CCH.  
 
The CCA also contains specific exceptions for educational institutions and 
libraries, archives, and museums (commonly referred to as LAMs) and 
photocopying in LAMs, archives, ephemeral recordings and person’s with 
disabilities.8 These exceptions are meant to be TRIPs compliant, as 
limitations and exceptions confined to “certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”9 Of note is that a 
court may rely on public interest grounds for allowing an otherwise 
infringing activity, but this common law power has been rarely exercised 
in Canada or in the UK, where it was invented.10  
 
 
                                                 
7 Michelin v CAW Canada [1997] 2 FC 306 denying parody. 
8 CCA (n 3) ss 29.4 – 30.4. 
9 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (15 Apr 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round vols 
31-33 ILM 1197 (“TRIPS”) art 13 incorporating art 9(2) of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic works (9 Sept 1886) 168 Consol TS 1853 (the so-
called “three-step test). 
10 D Vaver “Canada’s Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative Overview” 
(2004) 17 IPJ 125, 149; the defence only gained judicial notice once in Canada in R v 
James Lorimer & Co [1984] 1 FC 1065 (CA) in relation to Crown copyright, but was not 
ultimately applied.  
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B. ANALYZING CCH 
1. CCH CANADIAN LTD V LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA  
 
In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the Law Society of Upper 
Canada did not infringe copyright as its Great Library request-based 
reproduction services fell squarely within the allowances of the fair 
dealing doctrine. At issue were the single copies of reported decisions, 
case summaries, statutes, regulations and text selections reproduced 
pursuant to the Great Library Access Policy.11 According to the court, 
section 29 of the CCA, alongside the other exceptions, “must not be 
interpreted restrictively.”12 The enumerated purposes should be accorded 
“large and liberal interpretation” in order to ensure that “users’ rights” are 
not unduly constrained, and is not limited to non-commercial or private 
contexts.13 In this case, lawyers carrying on the business of law for profit 
were held to be conducting non-infringing research.  
 
The court explained that to prove that a dealing was fair pursuant to CCA 
s 29, the defendant Law Society had the onus to prove (1) that the dealing 
was for the purpose of either research or private study and (2) that it was 
fair. Up to this point, the issues presented are consistent with those of a 
traditional fair dealing test in Canada and the UK.  
 
As the court begins its analysis of the fair dealing doctrine—and drawing 
from UK and US approaches—it endorses certain factors which may be 
more or less relevant in future fair dealing cases. It also acknowledges that 
there may be other unnamed factors that could be used to assess the 
fairness of a dealing. Significantly, the court collapses an evaluation of 
whether the use could be construed as “research or private study” into the 
second analytical stage—whether the dealing was fair. In doing so, the 
first “hurdle” becomes one of the factors that is more or less relevant. In 
this way, the court softens the need to adhere to the traditional strictures of 
                                                 
11 While the issue of authorization of copyright infringement was also material for the 
purposes of this paper, this issue will not be addressed.  
12 CCH (n 1) [48]. 
13 ibid [51]. 
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proving fair dealing and puts into practice its assertion that the enumerated 
purposes require a liberal interpretation.  
 
Below follows the court’s six factors as construed and applied in the 
context of the case.   
 
a. PURPOSE (AND COMMERCIAL NATURE) OF THE DEALING 
 
The court asserts that this first criterion “should not be given restrictive 
interpretation or this could result in undue restriction of users’ rights.”14 
Courts should adopt an objective test to assess the users’ real purpose or 
motive in using the copyrighted work. The Great Library’s Access Policy 
states that its patrons making a request must delineate a legitimate purpose 
of use and where any ambiguity arises, the matter is referred to the 
Reference Librarian. For the court, this policy provided reasonable 
safeguards that the materials were being used for the purpose of research 
and private study. 
 
The commercial nature of the dealing is an important consideration—
research done for commercial purposes may not be as fair as research done 
for research purposes. However, the court emphasizes that research is “not 
limited to non-commercial or private contexts.”15 While the court does not 
clearly state that commercial research is fair dealing, it states that it 
certainly can be.  
 
b. THE CHARACTER OF THE DEALING 
 
Here the focus is on how the works were dealt with, for instance multiple 
copies widely distributed can be unfair. In the Law Society’s case this 
factor was met favourably: only single copies were made available to 
individual members of the legal profession.16 Further, if the copy is 
destroyed after it is used this may favour a finding of fairness. Courts can 
also consider the custom or practice in the industry to assess fairness. It is 
                                                 
14 ibid [54]. 
15 ibid [51]. 
16 ibid [67]. 
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unclear whose perspective in the industry should be valued. Relying on 
custom can be dangerous since custom is often unilateral and often set by 
the party with the greater bargaining power.17 Arguably should the 
educators’ or students’ perspective be considered (who may be using 
works in an infringing fashion in certain circumstances) there could be fair 
dealing. Or alternatively, if the right holder’s perspective is valued, custom 
could work against users. As the court did not expressly apply custom, it 
will be challenging to anticipate its applicability to future cases. Courts, of 
course, can (and should) rely on the existing body of caselaw in copyright 
and contract law to assess custom.18 The custom is implied by “the custom 
of a locality or by the usage of a particular trade” and “must be strictly 
proved.”19 
 
c. THE AMOUNT OF THE DEALING 
 
This factor seems to be a weaker consideration. The logic goes like this: 
the larger the taking the less the fair dealing. But of course, in several 
circumstances, as in the case of photographs it may be impossible to deal 
fairly with the work without copying the entire work. The court notes that 
for the purpose of research and private study it may be essential to copy an 
“entire academic article or an entire judicial decision.”20 This wholesale 
inclusion would not likely be the case for the purposes of criticism or 
review in the case of literature. Research and private study is thus 
accorded wider scope under the court’s reading of fair dealing. On the 
amount of the dealing, the court relied on the Great Library’s Access 
Policy that it would exercise discretion to ensure fair dealing. In most 
                                                 
17 As seen in the case of freelance journalists and their publishers in Canada where 
publishers relied on their “custom” to justify digital reproduction of the authors’ works 
without the authors’ permission or due payment; see G D’Agostino (2007) (n 3). 
18 G D’Agostino “Anticipating Robertson: Defining Copyright Ownership of Freelance 
works in New Media” (18)(1) Cahiers de Propriété Intellectuelle 2006 tr « En attendant 
Robertson : Définir la possession du droit d'auteur sur les œuvres des pigistes dans les 
nouveaux médias » 166. 
19 This high standard requires that the custom is (1) notorious, (2) as certain as a written 
contract, and (3) reasonable: Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract (28th edn OUP Oxford 
2002) 151. 
20 CCH (n 1) [56]. 
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occasions, only one judgment was copied and for secondary materials, 
when the requested amount was more than 5 per cent, a request could be 
refused. There was no evidence that the Great Library received and 
supplied multiple copy requests.   
 
d. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEALING 
 
Here two criteria may lead a court against a fair finding where (a) there 
was a non-copyrighted work available as an alternative and (b) where the 
use of the copyrighted work was not reasonably necessary to achieve the 
“ultimate purpose.”21 For instance, criticism could be equally effective by 
not actually reproducing the copyrighted work—this may weigh against 
fair dealing.22 
 
In CCH, the court remarks that there were no alternatives to the Great 
Library’s photocopying service as (1) twenty per cent of the Great Library 
patrons were outside Toronto and (2) researchers were not allowed to 
borrow materials from the Great Library, thus justifying the need for 
copying.23 Curiously, the court focuses more on the ease to access the 
works, than on the actual availability of non-copyrighted works.  
 
The court posits that the availability of a licence is irrelevant to weighing 
whether there were alternatives to the dealing. Accordingly, only because 
a user failed to obtain a licence should not be interpreted as proof that the 
dealing was not fair. If this were the case, the owners’ monopoly would be 
extended beyond the objective of balance in the CCA. As such, if a 
dealing clearly falls into fair dealing in the first place, that dealing should 
not be subject to a licence. This analysis seems consonant with several 
stakeholder positions within the educational community that there exists a 
                                                 
21 ibid. 
22 A comparative instance of this is in Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and others 
[2001] Ch 143 (CA) (“Hyde Park”) [40] where publishing photographs of Lady Diana 
was merely gratuitous; having described any relevant portion of the photos would have 
sufficed and did not require reproduction. 
23 CCH (n 1) [69]. 
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clear for fear culture to obtain often unnecessary licences out of excessive 
caution.24  
 
e. NATURE OF THE WORK 
 
According to the court if the work is unpublished, the dealing may be 
more fair “in that its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a 
wider public dissemination of the work.”25 While the court remarks that 
this would serve one of the goals of copyright it is nonetheless a departure 
from previous Canadian caselaw. Equally, as noted below, this reasoning 
is contrary to the UK and US caselaw.26  The court suggests that 
protecting the author and furthering wide public dissemination are two 
conflicting objectives. One cannot further public dissemination if the 
priority is to protect (and presumably reward) the author. One factor that 
may soften this anti-author perspective is if the work in question were 
confidential in nature.27  
 
                                                 
24 In Canada, see CMEC “Copyright in Education” 
<http://cmec.ca/copyright/copyInternet.en.stm> (last visited June 29, 2007); M Wilkinson 
“Filtering the Flow from the Fountains of Knowledge” Ch 12 in M Geist (ed) In the 
Public Interest (Irwin Law Toronto 2005) 331. In the US: W Fisher et al “The Digital 
Learning Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the 
Digital Age – A Foundational White Paper” Harvard Law School Research Publication 
No 2006-09 (Berkman Center for Internet and Society) 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/copyrightandeducation.html> (visited 29 June 
2007) (“White Paper”); J Urban and L Quilter “Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects?’ 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the DMCA” 
<http://static.chillingeffects.org/Urban-Quilter-512-summary.pdf> (visited 29 June 2007) 
(“Chilling Effects”). 
25 CCH (n 1) [58]. 
26 In US they went as far as developing a presumption against fair dealing for 
unpublished works see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 
(SCt 1985) 546; later overruled in Fair Use of Unpublished Works Publ No 102-492 
(1992) 102d Cong 2d Sess, 106 Sat 3145 codified at 17 USC  107; in UK, see Hyde Park 
(n 22) and text to n 125. 
27 In Hyde Park (n 22)[40] the court considered that the works were subject to an 
agreement: “I do not believe that a fair minded and honest person would pay for the 
dishonestly taken driveway stills and publish them in a newspaper knowing that they had 
not been published or circulated…” 
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The Great Library easily met this factor as the works in question were 
essential to legal research and were subject to its Access Policy stating that 
the patron’s purpose to access the works must be for research, private 
study, criticism, review or use in legal proceedings.28   
 
f. EFFECT OF THE DEALING ON THE WORK 
 
If the work in question competes with the market of the original work it is 
less likely that the dealing will be found to be fair. In underscoring that the 
market factor “is neither the only factor nor the most important factor’ the 
court seems to suggest that this factor is less important than the others. 
Interestingly, this “market substitute” factor seems to be more important in 
the UK.29  
 
There was no evidence advanced to indicate that there was an effect on the 
publishers’ market. Rather, the publishers continued to produce new 
reporter series and other legal publications during the period of the Great 
Library’s request-based copying. The court acknowledges that while the 
Law Society has the evidentiary burden, “it lacked access to evidence 
about the effect of the dealing on the publishers’ market.”30 And so, this 
decision suggests that the onus may be reversed if the defendant cannot 
access market impact evidence. This seems fair as the publishers are often 
the more sophisticated parties in a better position to access such records, 
though potentially a tall order as it may involve crystal ball-gazing.31 
 
 
2. CCH OBSERVATIONS: USER-CENTRIC APPROACH 
 
From the analysis of the six factors it seems clear that the courts’ penchant 
is pro-user. As further detailed below, this can be seen in particular in the 
                                                 
28 CCH (n 1) [71]. 
29 eg in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142 (CA)[106] it is the 
most important factor. 
30 CCH (n 1) [72]. 
31 See infra n 163. 
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court’s language, liberal interpretation of fair dealing, its elevated status of 
the doctrine as compared to other copyright exceptions, and its underlying 
policy preoccupations.  
 
a. DEFENCE TO USER RIGHT 
 
Even before CCH, depending on the speaker’s perspective, various terms 
were used to denote fair dealing such as “exceptions” “exemptions” 
“defences” or “user rights”.32 Still, whereas in previous cases and as 
featured in almost every textbook, fair dealing was conceived of as a 
defence, CCH construes it more as a “right” and an “integral” part of 
copyright law.33  
 
b. EXPANDED PURPOSES 
 
CCH advocates for a liberal approach to interpreting the purposes of the 
dealing as these “should not be given restrictive interpretation.”34 In this 
sense, new purposes could be included under the enumerated grounds. 
Parody could be one of these. Significantly, the court considers the 
purposes of research under the first of six factors, “purposes (and 
commercial nature) of the dealing”. The court thus seems to soften the 
rigidity of following the more traditional schematic approach (where it 
first assessed whether the use fell under the enumerated purpose and then 
examined fairness). Rather, the court collapses the first part of the 
“purposes” analysis into the second part—assessing fairness. As indicated 
below, here the court aligns itself with the more flexible US approach 
where there are no enumerated grounds, but an open list of purposes.    
 
                                                 
32 Vaver (n 6) 148-49; P Esmail “CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada 
Case Comment on a Landmark Copyright Case” (2005) 10 Appeal 13-24 [17]. 
33 For fair dealing as a defence pre CCH: see Allen v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd 
(1997) 152 DLR (4th) 518 [34]; for fair dealing as an exception: Boudreau v Lin 150 DLR 
(4th) 324 (OCJ) Metivier J [48]; More recently, terms like “principle” have also been 
used: M Bouchard “The Copyright Board: A Review of Some Recent Issues and Future 
Challenges” (The Law Society of Upper Canada Entertainment, Advertising & Media 
Law Symposium held in Toronto on April 27-28, 2007). 
34 CCH (n 1) [54]. 
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c. EXPANDED WORKS 
 
CCH clarifies that entire court decisions, typically under Crown copyright, 
can be copied fully and fairly. Following this logic, this may be the case 
with other government works, such as statutes, reports, and press releases.  
 
d. EXCEPTIONS AND FAIR DEALING 
 
CCH favours parties relying on fair dealing over other exceptions.35  
While counsel’s arguments at the onset of CCH in 1993 were in large part 
conditioned by the lack of the existing “libraries, archives, museums” or 
“educational institutions” exceptions, the Supreme Court nonetheless 
emphasized that an applicable user can always rely on the fair dealing 
doctrine first:36 “It is IF when a library were unable to make out the fair 
dealing exception under s. 29 that it would need to turn to s. 30.2 of the 
Copyright Act to prove that it qualified for the library exemption.”37 The 
court prefers the blessing of the fair dealing doctrine over reliance on 
specific exceptions. This may be because, fair dealing, as construed by the 
court, now allows for a more flexible framework.  
 
 
 
 
e. CONSTRUCTING FAIR DEALING—INFRINGEMENT, BURDEN OF 
PROOF AND AGENCY  
 
In a traditional copyright infringement suit, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proof to show infringement. The burden then shifts on the defendant to 
advance a defence. The court seems to alter this progression in two ways: 
(1) it skips over a traditional analysis of infringement and (2) it may shift 
the onus of proof on the plaintiff for disproving fair dealing.  
 
                                                 
35 ibid. [49] “it is only if a library were unable to make out the fair dealing exception 
under s 29 that it would need to turn to s 30.2 of the Copyright Act to prove that it 
qualified for the library exemption”. 
36 ibid. 
37 CCH (n 1) [49]. 
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First, its discussion of infringement is limited to authorization of 
infringement which is a different analysis than the typical “substantial part 
doctrine” to infringement.  Rather, having reasoned that there is no 
authorization, the court proceeds immediately into a fair dealing analysis 
by framing fair dealing as an exception to copyright.38 Second, the court 
may shift the onus of proof in two ways, as it reasons that: (a) To establish 
fair dealing, the defendant need not adduce evidence that every use of the 
provided material was conducted fairly but can rely on its own general 
practice.39 For instance, in the case of the Great Library, its internal 
Access Policy—to photocopy only for purposes of research, review, 
private study and criticism with a corresponding gate-keeper role by the 
Reference Librarian for the copying of substantial secondary sources—
was seen as sufficient to show that its own practices were research-based 
and fair and it need not have proven that each of its patrons dealt fairly 
with the supplied materials.40 It is worth asking whether it is fair for 
librarians to shoulder the burden to police fair dealing. On the other hand, 
following rigid rules (eg establishing copy quotas through legislation) 
while perhaps clearer to all parties, would be too restrictive and not 
entirely reflective of the realities and goals of user experiences. Indeed, 
imposing a copy quota is the approach taken in Australia where apparently 
no more than ten percent of a work can be copied.41 Also vesting librarians 
with this gate-keeping role may allow them to better prove fair dealing. 
 
And (b) While the Law Society has the evidentiary burden, because it 
could not access market impact evidence on the publishing market, the 
court holds it more appropriate for the plaintiff publishers and not the 
defendant users to make the case that they were negatively affected. The 
court thus allows the Law Society the right to rely on the Great Library’s 
                                                 
38 ibid [51] “The fair dealing exception under s. 29…” 
39 ibid [63]. 
40 Access Policy detailed at ibid [65]. 
41 Exposure Draft Part 4 of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006: Exceptions and other 
Digital Agenda Review Measures  (October 2006). 
<http://www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/Submissions/x0605.pdf>(visited 29 June 2007)14; 
but see K Weatherall commentary that the Draft is crafted in such a bad way that it is 
unclear as to what it actually does: <http://weatherall.blogspot.com/2006/10/on-
copyright-amendment-bill-and-ipods.html> (visited 29 June 2007). 
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general practice to establish fair dealing, rather than having to adduce 
evidence. The court embraces the concept of agency.42 As illustrated in 
Tariff 22,43 knowing of the potential of end user infringement, will not 
absent express knowledge of end user infringing activity be seen as the 
intermediary authorizing end user infringement.   
 
f. CAUTIONARY NOTE ON CCH USER-CENTRIC POLICY 
 
Any analysis of the state of copyright post-CCH, must be rooted in an 
understanding of what the Supreme Court understands to be Parliament’s 
policy objectives. The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirms its previous 
ruling in Théberge that the CCA has supposedly dual objectives: “…a 
balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward 
for the creator…”44 The court maintains that the judiciary “should strive to 
maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals.”45 The court 
suggests that when copyright law promotes the encouragement and 
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect this is in the public 
interest. For the court, the chief method of attaining this is to protect user 
rights. Rewarding the “creator” is an important part of Canada’s so-called 
dualistic copyright objectives but presumably not as in the public interest. 
 
CCH’s skewed expression of balance and the objectives of copyright law 
is seen further in its discussion of the doctrine of originality. The court 
maintains that when courts lower the standard of originality, the balance 
tips more in favour of the author/creator at the loss of a robust public 
domain to foster future creative innovation.46 While this may certainly be 
plausible, more often than not, copyright assignments and therefore the 
role of contract law (where the owner steps into the creator’s shoes) allows 
for this erosion. In other words, understanding the dynamic relationship 
                                                 
42 Consistent with Wilkinson’s analysis (n 24) 346. 
43 SOCAN v CAIP 2004 SCC 45 [88] also known as Tariff 22 decision (“Tariff 22”). 
44 CCH [10] citing Théberge v Galerie d’Art due Petit Champlain Inc [2002] 2 SCR 336 
at [30- 31] 
45 CCH [10]. 
46 CCH (n 1) [24]. 
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between author and owner is also important when accounting for future 
innovation and a robust public domain. 
 
This perhaps ill-conceived copyright policy is matched by equally ill-
conceived language. The court juxtaposes the public v. the creator in 
grounding its objectives, but in framing the issues it states: “this case 
requires this Court to interpret the scope of both owners’ and users’ right 
under the Copyright Act…” 47 While the court notes the “creator” in its 
discussion of balancing copyright objectives, the court matter-of-factly  
replaces her with the term “owner” in the framing of the issues. Creators 
and owners are not the same category of stakeholders for the purposes of 
copyright.48 Their interests are often conflicting. One cannot easily replace 
them as if they were synonyms as the court and many commentators often 
do. Indeed, it is not entirely helpful when commentators argue that CCH 
has “shifted the focus of copyright law from the pro-author approach that 
had dominated in the past to a balanced approach that weighs the rights of 
the author against those of the user.”49 And that as a result, “the law in 
Canada is now that the courts must balance the interests of the authors of 
works against the public interest.”50 This is unfortunate copyright parlance 
in Canadian CCH commentary, and copyright generally.51  
 
So while finally laudable that the court champions user rights, long 
forgotten by Canadian legislatures and the judiciary, where do creators fit 
in CCH? While the policy for creators is not central to CCH (perhaps 
because for the most part the case deals with judges as creators, not the 
(stereo)typical category of creators like musicians, freelance authors, 
bloggers and so on), this oversight may limit future “balanced” rulings. 
Would the court have reached a similar ruling if other categories of 
creators were at issue? Robertson v Thomson Corp, dealing with freelance 
                                                 
47 ibid [13] [emphasis added]. 
48 As repeatedly argued in each of the noted publications at G D’Agostino (n 3).  
49 Esmail (n 32) [3]. 
50 ibid [31]. 
51 But see M Geist “Strongest pro-user rights decisions in the world” Law Bytes Toronto 
Star (22 March 2004) available at <www.michaelgeist.ca> where he interprets CCH as 
attempting to balance user rights against those of owners and creators.  
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authors, may decide such an issue, but the new trial is yet to make its way 
in the courts.52 In CCH, judges and lawyers were creators whose works at 
issue were decided and shaped by judges and lawyers. The ultimate goal 
sought by the Great Library’s copy practices was to “help ensure that legal 
professional in Ontario can access the materials necessary to conduct the 
research required to carry on the practice of law.”53 This practice saves the 
cost of additional hotel bills and other travel expenses to non-Toronto 
lawyers and applies to self-represented litigants as well.54 Had the court 
ruled otherwise, Toronto lawyers may have received an unfair advantage 
over other members of the profession. Also, it has been argued that the 
cost of legal services would have increased for clients had the publishers 
been successful (lawyers would have had to pay extra for copies and 
would pass on the cost to its clients).55 As a result, the Supreme Court was 
intimately familiar with the practices and repercussions of deciding 
otherwise. Still, these context-specific factors are not easily applicable to 
other creative domains, where reaping from the copyrighted work is often 
the sole source of income for other kinds of creators.  
 
C. STATE OF JUDICIAL PLAY BEFORE CCH 
 
Before CCH, the judiciary varied in its approach to fair dealing. Some 
courts were more restrictive and others more liberal in their reasoning. 
                                                 
52 Updated as at 9 July 2007; see infra n 52.  
53 CCH (n 1) [63]. 
54 Esmail (n )[28]. 
55 Law Society of Upper Canada “Notice to the Profession: Supreme Court of Canada 
Releases CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada Copyright Decision.” Though it 
seems that law societies were in discussion with Access Copyright nonetheless. The 
Copyright Committee of the Federation reaffirmed to CanCopy (now Access Copyright) 
its willingness to continue discussions with respect to possible blanket licenses for certain 
copying activities by members of the legal profession:  Law Society of Saskatchewan 
“Copyright Notice to member of the Canadian Legal Profession form the National 
Copyright Committee of the Federal of Law Societies of Canada” (14 Dec 1999). 
<http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca/newlook/News/lawsuit3.htm> (29 June 2007); access 
policies remain the same: <http://library.lsuc.on.ca/GL/services_access.htm> 
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Factors like the motive of the dealing were also more pronounced, as were 
the policies of copyright towards non-users.   
 
 
1. RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION  
 
Most commentators argue that pre-CCH there was a restrictive 
interpretation of fair dealing.56 Many contend that copyright law has been 
quite expansionist in protecting owner’s/creator’s rights (here the same 
noted comments apply as scholarship has often conflated the two parties 
long before CCH).57 
 
Perhaps most illustrative of this approach is the Michelin v CAW Canada 
case.58 In Michelin, the tire company sued a union for infringement for its 
use of the Michelin man logo (the Bibendum) in union leaflets distributed 
during a labour dispute. 
 
The defendants unsuccessfully argued that the use of the Bibendum was a 
parody and therefore an exception to copyright infringement under fair 
dealing for the purposes of criticism. In placing the burden of proof 
squarely with the defendants, the court ruled that parody was not an 
exception to infringement within the CCA or within the jurisprudence.59 
More pointedly, parody was not synonymous with criticism.60  The court 
was adamant not to rely on US caselaw where parody could exist under 
fair use.61 And even if the court were to have followed the US courts, fair 
                                                 
56 LE Harris “Editorial” (2004) Copyright and New Media Law Newsletter. 
57 D’Agostino (n 3) arguing that in the context of mainstream publishing copyright law 
increasingly favours right holders over authors; see also CJ Craig “Locke, Labour and 
Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law” 
(2002) 28 Queen’s LJ 1; A Drassinower “Taking User Rights Seriously” Ch 16 in M 
Geist (ed) In the Public Interest (Irwin Law Toronto 2005) 462 and S Trosow “The 
Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital” 
(2003) 16 Can JL & Jur 217-224. 
58 [1997] 2 FC 306 (“Michelin”). 
59 ibid [60]. 
60 ibid [61]. 
61 ibid [63]. 
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dealing would still have failed since the other two requirements had not 
been met, namely (1) the author’s name or the source of the work were 
unmentioned and (2) there was no fair treatment.62 The court noted that 
exceptions should be strictly interpreted and that fair dealing in particular 
lists an exhaustive set of grounds.63 Accordingly, ruling otherwise would 
create a new exception in the statute. In this light, Michelin was extremely 
deferential to Parliament: “If Parliament had wanted to exempt parody as a 
new exception under fair dealing it would have done so.”64  
 
This case represents a clear shunning of following a US fair use approach 
which was later expressly adopted in CCH. Against CCH, Michelin, 
promoting a restrictive approach, no longer seems to be good law.  
 
 
2. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION 
 
But before CCH, there were also markings of a liberal interpretative 
approach. In Allen v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd 65 a freelance 
photographer sued a newspaper publisher for copyright infringement for 
reproducing a magazine cover which contained a photo he took on 
commission. While the testimony from both sides on custom of the 
industry resulted in divided views, the court ultimately ruled that the 
photographer only held copyright in the photo and not in the cover which 
was created by the magazine.66 The magazine did not object to reuse of its 
                                                 
62 Pursuant to then Copyright Act s 27(2)(a.1) court remarks this requirement made 
pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of 
Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 
December 1992 Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289 (entered into force 1 January 
1994)(“NAFTA”) s 64(1). “The substantial quantity of the original work used in the 
leaflets and posters also casts doubt on the fairness of the defendant’s treatment.” 
Michelin (n 58)[70]. 
63 Michelin (n 58) [65]; also relied on Bishop v Stevens [1990] 2 SCR 467. 
64 Michelin (n 58) [71]. 
65 Allen (n 33). 
66 ibid.  
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cover and, in any event, the court found the fair dealing defence for the 
purposes of news reporting applied. 
 
The court overturned the trial decision ruling that fair dealing did not 
apply to an entire copyrighted work. The court held that fair dealing is 
“purposive” and not simply a mechanical test. In citing a US decision, “the 
extent of the copying is one important factor, but only one to be taken into 
account, along with several others.”67 While the court did not 
schematically assess a list of factors as in CCH, it examined the nature and 
purpose of the use which was found to include current news. Also, the 
court considered the “market substitute” criterion noted in CCH, in that 
the use of the photo was “not to gain an unfair commercial advantage over 
[the plaintiff] Allen or [the magazine] Saturday Night.”68 Moreover, as in 
CCH, fair dealing was also allowed within a commercial context of a 
periodical publisher, The Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. 
 
As in CCH, Allen adopted a liberal approach and weighed the following 
factors: (1) the purpose of relaying a current event was allowed in a 
commercial context (2) the nature of work as an entire work such as a 
photograph was fair dealing and (3) the market substitute factor allowed 
the court to consider that the magazine did not seek to gain a commercial 
advantage over the market for the original work. 
 
Notably, regarding the extent of the work copied, in an earlier decision 
Zamacois, an entire newspaper article was reproduced and this was not 
fair dealing for purposes of criticism.69 The defendants unsuccessfully 
argued that, (1) the article was necessary since another article published in 
the same edition criticized the work and (2) the copied article was of 
current interest of an economic or political topic. For the court, one could 
not reproduce an article in full without the author’s permission of the work 
                                                 
67 Citing Williams & Wilkins Co v United States 417 US 907 (US Cl Ct 1974) 
(“Williams & Wilkins”). 
68 Allen (n 33) [38]. 
69 Zamacois v Douville (1943) 2 CPR 270 (Ex Ct)(Angers J) 302 [104] (“Zamacois”). 
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which he criticizes.70 But this decision has come under much criticism and 
as a result of CCH its precedential value is weak.71 
 
3. MOTIVE 
 
CCH did not apply motive, at least bad motive.72 In previous cases, such 
as in Boudreau v Lin, there was no fair dealing for private study found in a 
professor’s paper containing substantial copied portions of a student’s 
work.73 The court zeroed in on the fraudulent nature of the dealing. The 
professor had deleted the student’s name from the paper, presented it at a 
conference without credit and also sold copies of it to other students.74 
From this perspective, even though one of the court’s policy objectives 
was to prevent the appropriation of the author’s labour, the bad faith 
conduct where the professor “blatantly” breached copyright seems to have 
weighed heavily in finding otherwise.75 It will be interesting to see the 
extent to which future fair dealing cases account for bad faith. By contrast 
in CCH, the Great Library’s closely enforced Access Policy put the 
defendant in a favourable light.  
 
4. POLICY 
 
While CCH featured a user-centric policy oriented court, previous cases 
were perhaps more mindful of the creator. In Breen v Hancock House 
                                                 
70 ibid. 
71 eg some argue its weakness even before CCH: MF Morgan “Trash Talking: The 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software” (1994) 26 Ottawa LRev 
arguing that Hubbard’s approach seems preferable. 
72 The “real purpose” or “motive” was treated as a sub-factor though not applied: CCH (n 
1) [54] 
73 Boudreau (n 33). 
74 ibid [49] 
75 ibid [50-1] see for an interesting discussion of role of university to regulate activities of 
its professors especially vis-à-vis its students. 
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Publishers Ltd 76 an author copied substantial portions of a thesis into a 
book which he later published. In denying fair dealing, the court found 
that   while the book enjoyed little commercial success, the defendant had 
appropriated the plaintiff’s skill, time and talent.77 He had made liberal use 
of about 20 to 30 pages of the thesis which comprised a qualitative 
substantial portion of the author’s work.78 An interesting question here is 
how can one argue otherwise for the “public interest” in the context of this 
case? Can this creator be distinguished from the authors in CCH who 
created decisions and secondary materials? It is unclear whether following 
CCH, Breen would have had a similar result. Against the past, post-CCH 
now users stand in a better position in proving fair dealing. 
 
D. POST-CCH: HAVE COURTS POST CCH TAKEN ITS LEAD? 
 
While there has been no copyright case on fair dealing post-CCH, cases 
addressing copyright issues generally have considered CCH, namely 
concerning the doctrine of originality, authorization, and general policy 
principles.79  
 
In the “Tariff 22” decision involving retransmission rights, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the need for a liberal interpretation in balancing rights of 
owners and the limitations of those rights as they are not just 
                                                 
76 Breen v Hancock House Publishers Ltd 6 CIPR 129 (Fed Ct) (Joyal J). 
77 ibid [20]. 
78 Curiously, the infringing author had always assumed that academic work (eg like a 
thesis) was in the public domain and therefore not subject to copyright protection; ibid 
[10] 
79 eg R v Allen 2006 ABPC 115 (Alb PCt) [30] on originality; Columbia Pictures 
Industries v Gaudreault 2006 FCA 29 (Fed CA) [32] and Columbia Pictures Industries v 
Frankl 2004 FC 1454 (Fed Ct) [26] on authorization. But to date no decision has applied 
the fair dealing doctrine. While a trial date has yet to be set, a new suit by Robertson 
against Thomson Corp is expected to include fair dealing; namely whether the defence of 
fair dealing applies to any of the infringing acts if there is no implied licence (updated as 
at 9 July 2007). 
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“loopholes.”80 Thus far the Copyright Board of Canada has in obiter made 
some remarks on the potential applicability of the fair dealing doctrine to 
licensing issues and the need for further clarification.  
 
1. COPYRIGHT BOARD DECISIONS 
 
In Re Media Monitoring, the Board considered tariffs filed by the 
Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency (CBRA) for commercial and non-
commercial media monitors using its private broadcasters’ programs and 
communication signals. While the Board did not determine the extent, if 
any, to which the monitors' use of the repertoire may constitute fair 
dealing, it nonetheless commented on the potential applicability of the 
doctrine. It maintained that “profit-driven research may constitute fair 
dealing” and “that the person who facilitates another person's fair dealing 
may be entitled to the same protection under the Act as the first person.”81 
And that applied to this case, it could perhaps be argued “that some 
monitoring activity may constitute research or the facilitation of research, 
some of which may in turn constitute fair dealing.”82Accordingly,  
 
Until subsequent judgments clarify the portent of the CCH 
decision, this leaves open the possibility that certain activities of 
media monitors may not constitute protected uses for which they 
would require a licence.83  
 
In Re Breakthrough Films & Television while not a fair dealing case, the 
dissenting opinion in the Copyright Board pronounced itself on its scope.84 
The Board found that a television production company was justified to 
obtain a retroactive licence to work belonging to an unlocatable copyright 
owner it had excerpted. But for the dissent a retroactive licence should not 
                                                 
80 Tariff 22 [88] citing CCH (n 1) [48] which had quoted D Vaver Copyright Law (Irwin 
Law Toronto 2000) 171: “User rights are not just loopholes.”  
81 Re Media Monitoring (Copyright Board, March 29, 2005) [28]. 
82 ibid [29]. 
83 ibid [28]. 
84 Re Breakthrough Films & Television (Copyright Board, March 6, 2006). 
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have been granted since there was no copyright infringement.  In 
clarifying the full basis of its policy considerations, the dissent stated: 
 
While the interests of copyright owners should be protected, so 
should those of users, given the recent insistence of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in balancing the rights of the former and those of 
the latter. The public interest in the dissemination of works and 
subject-matters also should be given some attention.85 
 
However, fostering balance in copyright should not be at the expense of 
fostering compliance with copyright rules since this has a direct impact on 
licensing issues and ultimately on fair dealing. For the Board, “[u]sers 
should be encouraged to evolve towards practices where licences are 
sought before a work is used. The Board should not condone industry 
practices that view licensing copyright as an afterthought, thereby showing 
disregard for the rights of copyright owners.”86 In other words, proper 
licensing is part of the copyright balance. 
 
While retroactive licences help foster certainty, respect for copyright and 
dissemination of published works, they may deprive owners from “the 
right to choose between agreeing to a price and seeking compensation for 
the violation of copyright that has already occurred.”87  
 
And so, with respect to fair dealing the Board’s work may be affected 
directly:  
 
… whole areas of what are now considered to be protected uses (eg 
media monitoring) might suddenly join the realm of unprotected 
uses. This might have to be factored into the setting of certain 
tariffs, which brings us back to the already identified difficulties 
associated with applying concepts otherwise suited to an ex post 
facto decision in the exercise of an ex ante jurisdiction.88 
                                                 
85 ibid [29]. 
86 ibid [30]. 
87 ibid [55] A copyright licence should not be treated as a “dog licence” ibid [56]. 
88 Bouchard (n 33).  
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Thus as courts and, importantly, industry practices follow the liberal 
interpretation of research in CCH to include commercial purposes this 
may have a direct effect on tariff-setting.  
 
2. NOTE ON THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Even before CCH, the Council of Ministers of Education (CMEC) 
proposed an educational amendment to the CCA to permit the use of 
freely available internet materials.89 While beyond the scope of this paper 
to assess this proposal, it is unclear that this provision on its own will alter 
the current law or practices with respect to the educational uses of 
materials. Although perhaps useful to generate good will among this set of 
particular stakeholders, for the long term, many more parties will need to 
come to a consensus on many more matters than the mere use of internet 
materials. Moreover, some scholars argue that because of CCH, the federal 
government’s interventions on educational use of materials for long 
distance learning and coursepacks, as proposed in Bill C-60, may be “at 
best impractical and unnecessary, and at worst unenforceable”.90 As CCH 
espoused, a LAM need not rely on its specific exceptions but can rely on 
fair dealing. Significantly, however, fair dealing may not excuse mass 
distribution of materials.91 To date, these problems remain unaddressed.  
 
The existing governance mechanisms in the educational community do not 
seem tenable. For example, academics, students and other critics are 
dissatisfied with the current licensing regime.92 Very little money flows 
                                                 
89 see CMEC “Copyright in Education” <http://cmec.ca/copyright/copyInternet.en.stm> 
(last visited June 29, 2007). 
90 Wilkinson (n 24) 360. Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess 38th Parl 
2005 was introduced in the House of Commons on 20 June 2005 died on the Order of 
Paper on 28 November 2005. 
91 ibid 369. 
92 H Knopf  “Copyright Collectivity in the Canadian Academic Community: An 
Alternative to the Status Quo?” (1999-2000) 14 IJP 109. 
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back to the professor/author.93 Consider that the then CanCopy “had more 
than $18 million in undistributed royalties, and no apparently systematic 
way of determining to whom this money belongs.”94 These types of issues 
will continue to grate on students and other members of the educational 
community alike from teachers and librarians to the administrators of 
copyright. While CCH has liberalized greater uses of works comporting 
with fair dealing (eg for educational purposes), understanding and 
agreeing on any policy, law or court decision, must also be embraced (and 
perhaps generated) at the grass-roots level, by the all of the parties (in 
discord and accord) that are directly affected.  
 
III. FAIR DEALING IN THE UK 
 
The UK doctrine of fair dealing that has developed in the courts over 
almost two centuries made its first statutory appearance in the UK 
Copyright Act 1911.95  There has been pronounced academic debate on 
UK’s fair dealing provision. Some scholars have argued that the UK 
doctrine offers no principles or vision and that it contains too many 
obstacles that undermine its operation.96 Yet, others maintain that UK 
courts adopt a liberal interpretive approach.97 
 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 198898 (“CDPA”) Chapter III of the 
1988 Act, sections 28 to 76, is concerned with “Acts Permitted in Relation 
to Copyright Works”99 and contains the present fair dealing provisions in 
                                                 
93 “Few such authors are believed to earn more than $75 to $100 a Year from reprography 
royalties from CanCopy” Knopf  (n 92) (CanCopy is now Access Copyright).  
94 ibid. 
95 1 & 2 Geo 5 c 46 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Copyright. 
96 C Craig Fair Dealing and the Purposes of Copyright Protection (Queen’s University 
Kingston, Ontario LLM Thesis August 2000). 
97 L Bently and B Sherman Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn OUP Oxford 2004) 193. 
98 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c 48 as amended (UK) (“CDPA”). 
99 CDPA s 31 permits certain instances of incidental inclusion of copyrighted work; ss 32 
- 36 provide for permitted uses for the purposes of education; ss 37-44 contain rules 
regarding libraries and archives; s 45 - 50 concern public administration; ss 51-53 deal 
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sections 29 to 30 which stipulate enumerated purposes similar to its 
Canadian counterpart: (1) research or private study (2) criticism or review 
and (3) reporting current events. As in Canada, at least pre-CCH, the 
defendant must overcome three hurdles: (1) the dealing must fall into an 
enumerated category (2) the dealing must be fair (as per the common law 
criteria set out below) and (3) in the last two cases, there must be sufficient 
acknowledgment.100  
 
Against the conclusions of previous government studies, the recent 
Gowers Review has not recommended that fair dealing be amended.101 
Rather its recommendations follow the UK tradition to carve out specific 
exceptions. Gowers recommends to add several new exceptions, among 
which are those for parody and format-shifting.102 These two exceptions 
have not attracted any controversy.103 
 
                                                                                                                         
with designs; sections 54-55 deal with typefaces; s 56 is about works in electronic form; 
ss 57- 75 contain miscellaneous provisions; and s 76 ensures the effectiveness of defences 
with respect to adaptations.   
100 But for of current events by means of a sound recording, film, broadcast or cable 
programme: acknowledgement is not required: s 30(3). The purported explanation for this 
distinction is that on the basis that acknowledgements would unduly clutter reporting by 
these forms of media. A similar provision was contained in s 6(3) of the 1956 Act. 
Amended to give effect to Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 
2001/29/EC art 5(3)(c) (“Information Society Directive”). 
101 An independent review led by Andrew Gowers, asked by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer last year December, one year target met; see An independent review led by 
Andrew Gowers, asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer December 2005, one year 
target met; Government accepted all of the recommendations the day the Review was 
tabled in Parliament 6 December 2006; see <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/gowers_review_intellectual_property/gowersrevie
w_index.cfm> Gowers goes against previous reports:  The Whitford Report: Copyright 
and Designs Law, cmnd 6732 (1977) “The greater the number of special cases, the 
greater the scope for uncertainty [regarding the applicability of the fair dealing defence] 
in relation to cases not specifically dealt with.” [668]. 
102 Gowers (n 101) Recommendation 10b (format-shifting), Recommendation 12 
(parody). 
103 United Kingdom Patent Office (UKPO) Interview (5 February 2007). 
  
28                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 04 
 
The UK enumerated purposes are said to be liberally construed.104 By 
adopting an objective test, courts have made it reasonably easy to prove 
that a dealing fits in one of these categories. Still, this liberal construction 
is not consistent with CCH which arguably has expanded the actual 
allowable purposes perhaps to include a parody right in a future following 
of CCH.  
 
A. WHAT HAVE THE COURTS SAID ON THE ENUMERATED 
PURPOSES? 
1. RESEARCH OR PRIVATE STUDY 
 
Research and private study must be for a non-commercial purpose.105 
Some UK commentators argue that a database used in market testing for a 
new drug or a commercial training course would constitute research or 
private study.106 It is still a difficult middle ground to determine what is 
meant by commercial. Recital 42 of the Information Society Directive 
mandates that one must look at the activity rather than the “organizational 
structure and the means of funding the establishment”.107 One key factor 
seems to be that research need not be private.  Other important factors 
include the amount taken, if the work is readily available, and the effect on 
the market.108 It is possible for an agent to photocopy works for third 
parties but there are limitations if the copying would result in substantial 
dissemination of the same material.109  Arguably, this would be the same 
in CCH which allowed copying subject to a fair dealing compliant access 
                                                 
104 Bently (n 97) 193; see Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer plc [1999] 
EMRL 369 (“Marks & Spencer”); Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton Television Ltd [1998] 
FSR 43 (CA) (Walker LJ) (“Pro Sieben”) and Ashdown (n 29). 
105 Defined in CDPA (n 98) s 178: as not including direct or indirect commercial purpose 
106 Bently (n 97) 198. 
107 Information Society Directive (n 100).  
108 Bently (n 97) 198. 
109 CDPA (n 98) s 29(3)(b); eg instructors could not make multiple copies of articles for 
their students. 
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policy. Still, because of CCH, in Canada, research and private study can 
include commercial purposes.  
 
In the UK, the application of this purpose has been criticized for it fails to 
reflect the importance of non-textual media and it applies in a limited 
fashion to computer programs.110 This purpose also does not apply for a 
broadcast, sound recording or film.111 
 
2. CRITICISM OR REVIEW  
 
For a dealing to fit this category, the subject work must have been 
previously available to the public, be fair and have sufficient 
acknowledgement. In Sillitoe and Others v McGraw-Hill Book 
Company,112 there was no fair dealing in the use of original summaries 
incorporated into “Coles Notes.” The court found that the authors of the 
Notes, used very long extracts without sufficient acknowledgement. The 
Notes inclusion of brief commentaries under only some of the reproduced 
summaries was not sufficient for criticism or review. In Associated 
Newspapers Group Plc v News Group Ltd.113, at issue was the printing of 
letters owned exclusively by the Daily Mail by a competing newspaper, 
The Sun. The defendants’ motive had not been for the purpose of criticism 
or review, but to “attract readers.”114 In this case, the “death of the 
Duchess does [did] not require the publication of the contents of the 
letters.”115 One could simply have reported the event. 
 
                                                 
110 CDPA (n 98) s 29(4)-(4A).  
111 Pro Sieben (n 104). 
112 [1983] FSR 545 (“Sillitoe”). 
113 Associated Newspapers Group Plc v News Group Ltd [1986] RPC 515 (“Associated 
Newspapers”) 518. 
114 ibid. 
115 Associated Newspapers (n 113) 519. 
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3. CURRENT EVENTS REPORTING 
 
This purpose has been generally construed as news reporting, though a 
recent case, Pro sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd, has given 
its scope wider interpretation.116 Broadcasters have criticized Pro Sieben 
for its potentially wide applicability of current events now extending 
beyond news.117 The court has not clarified the extent of its new scope.  
 
B. THE DEALING MUST BE FAIR 
 
Once a defendant proves that work a falls into an enumerated purpose, the 
defendant must show that the dealing was fair. Hubbard v Vosper118 sets 
out the main test for fairness. For some scholars Hubbard, “represents the 
first major judicial attempt to define the concept of ‘fairness’ with respect 
to the fair dealing provisions contained, at that time, in section 6 of the 
1956 Copyright Act.”119 At issue was whether Hubbard’s book, as the 
founder of the Church of Scientology of California, infringed a book 
authored by a former member of the Church of Scientology, Vosper, 
which he relied upon extensively for his own work. In denying an 
application for an injunction, Lord Denning for the Court of Appeal 
maintained that whether a dealing is fair is a matter of fact and degree and 
all the circumstances of a particular case must be taken into account:120  
 
It is impossible to define what is ‘fair dealing’. It must be a question of 
degree. You must consider first the number and extent of the quotations 
and extracts. Are they altogether too many and too long to be fair? Then 
you must consider the use made of them. If they are used as a basis for 
                                                 
116 Pro Sieben (n 104) 625.  The fact that a German television station had paid £30000 to 
interview a woman of multiple pregnancies was “an event of limited and ephemeral 
interest, but … [still] a current event”.  
117 “Verdict causes stir for broadcasters” (1999) The Lawyer 22, 22. 
118 [1972] 1 All E.R. 1023 (CA) (“Hubbard”). 
119 Craig (n 96) 9.  
120 Hubbard (n 118) 1027.  
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comment, criticism or review, that may be a fair dealing. If they are used 
to convey the same information as the author for a rival purpose, that may 
be unfair. Next you must consider the proportions. To take long extracts 
and attach short comments may be fair. Other considerations may come to 
mind also. But after all is said and done, it must be a matter of 
impression.”121 
 
A court must therefore weigh the extent and proportion of the work used 
in relation to the original work and uses made (eg for a rival purpose).122 
An entire work may also be subject to the fair dealing defence.123 Since 
the Human Rights Act of 1998, courts need to be flexible and 
considerations of public interest are paramount.124 While not expressly 
delineated in the legislation, from the case law, several factors emerge on 
what is “fair” on the most part consistent with the Canadian jurisprudence: 
 
1. Nature of the work: if the work is unpublished, this will weigh 
against the defendant;125 in the case of confidential works (eg 
private letters) this will weigh more against fair dealing than the 
use of official reports of public importance. 
2. How the work was obtained: if leaked or stolen it is less likely to 
be fair.126 
3. Amount taken: while the least amount taken favours fair dealing, 
in some cases it may be fair to reproduce an entire work (eg if the 
work is short, like an epitaph).127 
                                                 
121 ibid. 
122 Craig highlights that, with respect to the relevance of a “rival purpose”, British 
Broadcasting Corp v British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd Times, [1991] 2 All E.R. 833 (Ch 
D), held that  BSB’s rivalry with the BBC did not necessarily take its actions outside the 
protection of the fair dealing defence. 
123 For Megaw LJ in the context of a parish magazine reproducing a twenty word epitaph: 
Hubbard (n 118) 1031. 
124 Ashdown (n 29) [71]. 
125 Hyde Park (n 22) in the case of current events. 
126 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241 (Ch D) (“Beloff”) 
127 Hubbard (n 118) 94-95; 98.  
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4. Uses made: the more transformative the better to favour fair 
dealing (eg the more that has been added by the user the better, as 
some have stated it pays to be long-winded).128 
5. Commercial benefit: if the work is used for a commercial benefit 
this will weigh against the defendant; one cannot derive a 
commercial benefit in research, unless there is some overriding 
element of public advantage.129  
6. Motives for the dealing: the courts employ an objective 
standard130 and consider if the motive is malevolent or altruistic.131 
7. Consequences of the dealing: this factor concerns the impact of 
the dealing on the market of the original work especially where 
parties are in competition; if a new work acts as a substitute for the 
original this weighs against fair dealing.132 
8. Purpose achieved by different means: were alternatives to the 
dealing available? Courts have found no fair dealing when the 
written word was just as effective as actual pictures.133  
 
C. HIERARCHY OF FACTORS 
 
While there appears to be an open list of criteria emerging, a recent case 
suggests that there is a hierarchy of factors. In Ashdown v Telegraph 
Group Ltd, a UK daily newspaper unsuccessfully claimed fair dealing in 
its use of confidential political material it published concerning the 
pending formation of the UK government.134 While the case 
                                                 
128 D Vaver Copyright Part II (Osgoode Hall Law School Toronto 1998) 522. 
129 Marks& Spencer (n 104) [257]. 
130 Hyde Park  (n 125) [36]. 
131 Pro Sieben (n 104) 614.  
132 Hubbard (n 118). 
133 Hyde Park (n 125). 
134  Ashdown (n 29) the public interest defence and freedom of expression claim were 
also advanced. 
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acknowledged Pro-Sieben’s liberal interpretation of current events135 
drawing from Laddie’s text,136 the court delineated a hierarchy of factors 
when deciding fair dealing, in the following order: 
 
(1) whether there was a market substitute to the dealing (if so, fair 
dealing will “most certainly fail”) 
(2) whether the work was published or previously exposed to public 
(if not, fair dealing will fail especially if the work was obtained by 
breach of confidence or some other underhanded way – here 
motive is relevant) 
(3) extent of the work taken (though a substantial part or entire work 
can be allowed). 137 
 
The appellate court found that the copied extract enhanced the commercial 
value of the newspaper, increasing its readership loyalty. And while some 
of the matters covered in the extract had been previously disclosed in a 
radio interview, the extract was obtained in breach of confidence and its 
most important parts were taken.138  
 
So although the court stated that where freedom of expression is at issue, 
courts may need to place less weight than previously on these hierarchy of 
factors, and more on others such as the political importance of the contents 
of the work,139 copyright won out: “We do not consider it arguable that 
Article 10 [of the Human Rights Act] requires that the Group [The 
Telegraph] should be able to profit from this use of Mr Ashdown's 
copyright without paying compensation.” 140 In other words, market 
                                                 
135 It might impinge upon the way in which the public would vote at the next general 
election. The 'issues' identified by the Sunday Telegraph may not themselves be 'events', 
but the existence of those issues may help to demonstrate the continuing public interest in 
a meeting two years earlier.  Ashdown (n 29) [64] 
136 H Laddie, P Prescott & M Vitoria The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd edn 
London Butterworths 200) [20.16]. 
137 Ashdown (n 29) [70]. 
138 ibid [72]-[76]. 
139 ibid [71]. 
140 ibid [82]. 
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impact (which is mindful of remunerating the author) may trump freedom 
of expression claims and appears to be the most important consideration.  
 
Comparatively, in post-CCH Canada, market impact is not as important a 
factor (in the UK, it is the most important). Market impact in the UK is 
specifically vigilant of remunerating the author. Whether the work is 
unpublished may yield opposite results in Canada (unpublished works tend 
towards a finding of fairness, whereas in the UK unpublished works are 
not fair). The extent of the work taken is treated similarly in Canada and in 
the UK, in that it is not a factor of paramount importance. The public 
interest is critical in both jurisdictions, but interpreted as a user right in 
Canada and meant to account for human rights in the UK.  
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IV. FAIR USE IN THE US 
A. US LEGISLATION 
 
Section 107 of the US Copyright Code entrenches the jurisprudence 
accumulated up to the 1976 revision and provides that the “fair use of a 
copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research” does not infringe copyright. Although the US 
offers an open list of permissible purposes against the Canadian and UK 
statutes, the caselaw has generally seen similar uses exonerated under fair 
use. The decision of whether a particular use is fair mandates the 
consideration of four statutorily entrenched factors.  
 
1. FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS 
 
a. THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE, INCLUDING 
WHETHER SUCH USE IS OF A COMMERCIAL NATURE OR IS FOR NON-
PROFIT EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES 
 
This factor considers whether the use is commercial or should be deemed 
transformative. More recently, good faith has been noted as a sub-
factor.141 Commercial use is but one factor and against a tide of caselaw is 
no longer presumptive. In Sony Corp of America v Universal City 
Studios Inc,142 a case concerning the use of the Betamax videotape 
recorder used for private ‘time-shifting’ of television programs, the court 
examined whether the user stood to gain from the use of copyrighted 
work, not whether the user had actual motive for monetary gain. In this 
case, time-shifting was found to be a non-commercial use. The court’s 
obiter statement that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
                                                 
141 This was not the case initially eg in Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios 
Inc 464 US 417 (SCt 1984) (“Sony”) where motive was not a factor.  
142 ibid. 
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presumptively unfair”143 was later embraced by subsequent courts seeking 
a bright-line to interpret fair use cases, but was ultimately rejected in 
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc.144 
 
Acuff-Rose, also known as the “Pretty Woman” case, concerned the 
parodic use of Roy Orbinson’s song by rap group 2 Live Crew. 
Overruling the lower court, the appellate court relied on the Sony 
presumption and found that fair use did not exonerate the rap group. 
However, the Supreme Court later overturned this decision stating that 
the commercial nature of a work should not be dispositive. Rather, 
“parody, like any other relevant use, has to work its way through the 
relevant factors and be judged case by case, in light of the ends of 
copyright law.”145 Relying on such a presumption would have distorted 
fair use and would have been “suggestive of a [US] judicial tendency to 
establish bright-line rules, evolved from in-built biases or 
assumptions…146 Today, in the US, there is no presumption against fair 
use if the defendant makes a commercial use. Commercial uses tend to 
weigh in favour of the plaintiff.147 CCH thus goes beyond US fair use, as 
the commercial nature can be one consideration and must not be one 
factor always considered.  
 
In Rogers v Koons,148 Koons a successful artist sculpted a “String of 
Puppies” to parody the plaintiff’s photograph of eight “Puppies” which 
had enjoyed wide commercial success. In doing so, he also used an 
enlarged photocopy of the puppies. The court rejected the parody 
argument, as Koons could have expressed the parody without directly 
copying Rogers' work. Koons' work was not commenting directly on the 
                                                 
143 ibid 451. 
144 510 US 569 (SCt 1994) (“Acuff-Rose”).  
145 Harper & Row (n 26) 1172. 
146 Craig (n 96) 128. 
147 ibid 125. This was the real intention of the court to set up a “balancing of the fair use 
factors”.  
148 Rogers v Koons 960 F 2d 301 (2d Cir 1992). 
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work itself, but rather on a general idea, so there was no need to copy. 
Also the court found bad faith and copying for profit-making motives.149 
 
Basic Books v Kinko Press, is the US “coursepacks” case where uses of 
copyrighted material for educational purposes by a commercial enterprise 
were not fair use. The four factors were analyzed. The copying was non 
transformative and was on a commercial scale. 150  While it was unclear 
how much profit Kinko made, the court found it important that Kinko had 
the intention of making profits.151 And so, its motives were only 
“purportedly altruistic.”152 This case can be contrasted with Williams & 
Wilkins where a government department copied articles from medical 
journals and disseminated them to researchers and personnel who 
requested them. The court found that the purposes of study and research 
were acceptable as these were socially useful objectives and not “true to 
photocopy shops, which reproduce for profit.”153 Further, the libraries had 
established fair use guidelines and did not charge a fee.  
 
A court post-CCH could yield similar holdings: accounting for parody 
and educational uses of works by government departments. In the UK, 
however, parody would still be prohibited. 
 
b. THE NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK 
  
For this factor courts consider whether the work is factional or fictional 
and whether published or unpublished. If there is substantial creativity, 
this tends to favour the owner. 
 
                                                 
149 ibid 310. 
150 “The effort utilized in this case was questionable at best and the level of judgment 
practically non-existent.” 758 F Supp 1522 (NY Dt 1991) (“Kinko”) 1529. 
151 ibid. 
152 ibid. “The insistence that theirs [motives] are educational concerns and not 
profitmaking ones boggles the mind.” 
153 cited in Kinko (n 150)1535; this can be contrasted with American Geophysical Union 
v Texaco 37 F3d 882 (2d Cir 1994): a class action by 82 scientific publishers against 
Texaco for copying its works to which it subscribed without paying royalties. 
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With respect to unpublished works, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v 
Nation Enterprises154 seemed to have instilled a presumption against fair 
use for unpublished works which was followed by lower courts. But 
Congress responded to the publishing industry’s concerns and overruled 
this presumption.155 In this case, a magazine (the Nation) published 
unauthorized quotations from former US president Ford’s unpublished 
memoirs. The court analyzed the four factors and denied fair dealing. 
Specifically, the court reasoned that the author has the right to control the 
first appearance of the work, as part of the right of first publication which 
encompasses the choice of whether to publish at all, when, where and in 
what form.156 In this case, the court found that Ford’s memoirs were 
subject to a confidentiality agreement and that any article produced from 
it would need approval. Further, the Nation’s “clandestine” publication 
afforded no opportunity for the author’s “creative or quality control” and 
contained a number of “inaccuracies”.157 The court found that the 
unauthorized quotations focused on “the most expressive elements of the 
work, [which] exceeds that necessary to disseminate facts.”158 In Basic 
Books while the court did not find fair dealing it noted that because the 
nature of the works was for educational purposes this factor weighed in 
their favour.159 The US and UK seem consistent in their interpretation of 
this factor, against the Canadian approach favouring users disseminating 
unpublished works. 
 
c. THE AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE PORTION USED IN 
RELATION TO THE COPYRIGHTED WORK AS A WHOLE. 
 
This factor leads to a sliding scale: as the dealing goes above a de 
minimis use it more likely goes against fair use. Courts still focus on what 
and not how much is used—the quality over the quantity of the taking is 
                                                 
154 Harper & Row (n 26) 546. 
155 Fair Use of Unpublished Works Publ No 102-492 (1992) 102d Cong 2d Sess., 106 Sat 
3145 codified at 17 USC 107. 
156 Harper & Row (n 26) 562.  
157 ibid. 
158 ibid. 
159 Kinko (n 26) 1533. 
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critical. In Basic Books entire chapters were copied and meant to stand 
alone therefore both quantitively and qualitatively significant. In Harper 
& Row the court focused on quantity and quality: though insubstantial, 
the extracts were the “heart of the book.”160 In Acuff-Rose, 2 Live Crew 
departed from the ‘heart’ and produced distinctive lyrics. Though when 
weighed with the character of use, entire works may be fair use. On the 
whole, as in Canada and the UK this factor seems like the least 
significant. 
 
d. THE EFFECT OF THE USE UPON THE POTENTIAL MARKET FOR OR 
VALUE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK.  
 
Harper & Row signaled this last factor as the single most important factor 
especially if the use becomes widespread and undermines the author’s 
potential market (since for the court the purpose of copyright is also to 
provide incentive to authors).161 Some lower courts have followed this 
dictum.162 Still, it is difficult for courts to anticipate the curtailment of the 
potential market as it can be like gazing in a crystal ball.163 
 
In Basic Books the purchase of the coursepacks was found to undermine 
the need to purchase full texts. The court also held that this would impact 
out-of-print books whose licence fees constituted a significant source of 
                                                 
160 Harper & Row (n 26) 565. In the case of parody, Harper & Row found this factor not 
very helpful because the parody necessarily must “go to the original’s ‘heart’ since the 
‘heart’ is what conjured up the song for parody; ibid 586-89; eg first line of lyrics and 
characteristic opening bass riff. 
161 “More important, to negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use 
‘should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.’ Harper& Row (n 26) 567 following Sony (n 141) 451 [emphasis in 
original]; isolated instances of infringements “become in the aggregate a major inroad on 
copyright that must be prevented.” Harper & Row (n 26) 567 
162 eg Arica Inst Inv v Palmer 970 F2d 1067 (2nd Cir 1992) 1078; Los Angeles News Serv 
v Tullo, 973 F 2d 791 at 798 (9th Cir 1992); Cable/Home Communication Corp v 
Network Prods Inc 902 F.2d 829 at 845 (11th Cir 1990). 
163 Nunez v Caribbean Intern News Corp 235 F3d 18 (1st Cir 2000) on market of 
photographs. Though it is clear that bootlegged CDs or software unfair. US v Slater 348 
F3d 666, 669 (where there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to instruct on fair use in 
criminal trial concerning unauthorized distribution of software). 
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income.164 Generally, in parody it is difficult that the work will act as a 
market substitute, as parody and the original serve different market 
functions.165 But in Rogers v Koons there was a presumption that the 
sculpture would harm the plaintiff’s future market.166 And on an earlier 
motion for summary judgment in Acuff-Rose, the absence of evidence on 
the effect of the parody on the nonparody market (eg Orbison’s market) 
caused the defendant to lose.167 In the US, market substitute is therefore a 
very important factor, in the UK, the most important and in Canada not as 
important and when considered CCH appears to place the onus of proof 
on the plaintiffs.  
 
Irrespective of the US’s statutory entrenchment of the four factors, it is 
still very difficult to determine a fair dealing and assess which if any 
factor is determinative. 
 
In other words, each of the four US statutory criteria require mandatory 
consideration in every case. As Acuff-Rose held there are no bright lines, 
few presumptions, and there must be a sensitive balancing of interests. 
Some argue that these criteria may enhance predictability but have 
reduced the flexibility available to the US court; others maintain that 
there is no predictability, it is difficult to articulate what fair use is, but 
that there is flexibility with emerging technologies.168 Ultimately, not all 
factors have to be fair for the end use to be fair and similarly, some 
factors can be fair but the end result is an unfair use. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 Kinko (n 150) 1534. 
165 Relying on Sony (n ) 451; Harper & Row (n 26) 590-594. 
166 Rogers (n 148) 312. An example is raised on a movie adaptation of a book impacting 
the potential market of selling the book’s adaptation rights. 
167 Harper & Row (n 148) 590-594. 
168 eg C Correa “Fair Use in the Digital Era” (Unesco Paris 2000). 
http://webworld.unesco.org/infoethics2000/documents/paper_correa.rtf  (29 June 2007) 
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2.  “OTHER” FAIR USE FACTORS 
 
In the recent case of Basic Books, the court considered other factors, 
besides the enumerated four factors: 
 
a. MONOPOLISTIC AND COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
 
In Basic Books, the defendant Kinko created a new “nationwide 
business” allied to the publishing industry by usurping the plaintiff’s 
copyrights and profits.169 Kinko had two hundred stores across the 
country and it was difficult for the plaintiff to challenge the defendant. 
Kinko asserted that the plaintiffs misused their copyrights and 
monopolized the industry in an effort to thwart the copying market and 
restrain competition.170 While Kinko advanced anecdotal evidence that 
there were unreasonable delays, undue response times and high costs in 
obtaining copyrighted materials for the courses, the court found no clear 
evidence. Importantly, the court implied that had there been such 
evidence, then this would have weighed in favour of fair use. The court 
seems to leave this door open for future cases. That is, fair dealing may be 
found if the defendant is able to show that the plaintiff engaged in 
monopolistic practices. In CCH, this factor was considered though the 
plaintiff had the burden of proof and failed to meet it.  
 
b. INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 
 
In Basic Books, the court noted that the defendant had violated 
“Classroom Guidelines” prohibiting the use of anthologies. Moreover, the 
court observed that the defendant had not advanced evidence that an 
instructor would be disabled without the use of the coursepacks. The 
court considered Williams & Wilkins where the library copying was 
subject to guidelines within fair use and did not charge a fee.171 Following 
institutional guidelines within fair dealing is also very important in CCH 
as the court relied heavily on the Great Library’s Access Policy for a 
finding of fairness. So, if the defendant can show adherence to policies 
                                                 
169 Kinko (n 150) 1534. 
170 ibid. 1538. 
171 ibid. 1535 citing Williams & Wilkins (n 67). 
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within fair dealing/fair use this factor will likely weigh strongly in their 
favour.  
 
C. FAIR USE IS “ILL” 
 
Before proceeding to outline some comparative threads among the three 
jurisdictions, some remarks must be made on the burgeoning body of 
scholarship, studies and reports criticizing US fair use. Fair use is said to 
be “ill, though hardly dead yet.”172 Peter Jaszi argues that claims of US 
fair use superiority are often misguided and many others have called on 
Congress to clarify fair use.173 There has been no shortage of solutions 
proposed.174 But to date Congress has resisted changing fair use. The 
courts have also failed to simplify fair use by attempting to establish 
bright-line presumptions (1) that commercial uses are unfair,175 (2) 
favouring plaintiff’s unpublished works,176 and (3) more recently, that 
works must be transformative to constitute fair use.177 Moreover, it is 
increasingly expensive to mount litigation to clarify the scope of use and 
some users may be risk-averse to begin with. The American Intellectual 
Property Law Association estimates the average cost to defend a copyright 
case to be just under one million US dollars.178 
                                                 
172 W Gordon “Keynote Fair Use: Threat or Threatened” (2004-2005) 55 Case W Reserve 
LRev 912 arguing that overbroad contract rules and the DMCA are the true threats to fair 
use.  
173 P Jaszi “Public Interest Exceptions in Copyright” [copy with author]; MW Carroll 
“Fixing Fair Use” "Fixing Fair Use". North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 85, 2007 
available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=945194> 4. 
174 Jessica Litman proposing an unfair competition standard for infringement; Michael 
Madison thinks that fair use should be re-written with more flexibility so that social 
practices that can benefit from fair use inform the analysis.  See Carroll (n 173) 11 for 
about a half page footnote detailing all of these sources. 
175 Presumption arose in Sony (n 141). 
176 Congress amendment: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use” 17 USC s 107 (2000) see discussion in Gordon (n 172) 910. 
177 Acuff-Rose (n 144) seconded Sony’s rejection, along with recent cases such as Nunez 
(n 163) exonerating nontransformative or exact copies of works.  
178 Cited in White Paper (n 24) 57.  
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Although fair use’s attention to context is certainly salutary, “it is so case-
specific that it offers precious little to artists, educators, journalists, 
Internet speakers, other” who want to use the copyrighted work.179 
Google’s digitization project of large library collections is a recent sign 
that in the digital age, issues of fair use have taken on urgency.180  
 
The Chilling Effects Report documents the culture of anxiety that now 
exists as rights holders aggressively attempt to thwart potential fair uses of 
works.181 Via private cease-and-desist letters, online service providers 
frequently cull user materials in order to earn a place in the “safe harbour” 
zone.182 And because the material is removed privately, no court examines 
the validity in advance of takedown. Further, a recent report from the 
Brennan Centre for Justice, “Will Fair Use Survive?” identifies in addition 
to cease-and-desist letters, notice and takedown, narrow industry “fair use 
guidelines” and an overzealous “clearance culture.”183 And more recently, 
the “Digital Learning Challenge” White Paper focuses specifically on the 
educational sector, calling for clearer fair use rules. The study reveals that 
the trend is for educators to clear for fear and license unnecessarily 
multiple copies of works for classroom use (typically allowed by 
statute).184 Doing so out of excessive caution, when fair use would 
                                                 
179 D Nimmer “Fairest of them All’ and other Fairy Tales of Fair Use” (2003) 66 Law & 
Contemp Probs 263, 280 “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the four fair 
use factors… it appears that the upshot would be the same.” 
180 In Author’s Guild et al v Google (filed September 20, 2005 in NY DCt) Google is 
arguing fair use in defence. 
181 Chilling Effects (n 24) eg merely providing a link to content on another website.  
182 s 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) Pub L No 105-304, 112 
Stat 2860 (Oct 28, 1998) provides “safe harbour” from copyright infringement.   
183 M Heins and T Beckles “Will Fair Use Survive?” New York Brennan Center for 
Justice 2005 <http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf> 
184 White Paper  (n 24) 57 documenting: “Comment of the University of Texas System, 
<http://www.copyright.gov/disted/comments/init020.pdf> at 5 indicating that the 
University seeks licenses for all copyrighted material, for lack of confidence in 
protections provided by fair use; but see Comment of the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill provided in White Paper (n 24) indicating that the university encourages 
professors to take advantage of the fair use doctrine for one-time or first uses of 
copyrighted material. 
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otherwise apply, is harmful.185 There is also extensively documented 
evidence of burdensome and uneven licensing systems and arrangements 
within schools.186 
 
What is more, there is a clear and negative interface between digital rights 
management (DRM) technologies and fair use.187 For instance, smaller 
schools (such as elementary and secondary schools) in the US lacking 
resources (and potentially skills) are precluded from licensing works if 
they do not comply with DRM requirements imposed by rights holders to 
begin with.188 The implications are that there is less use of content 
otherwise available and if available, prohibited from access because of the 
lack of resources. And while educators are generally averse to 
technological protection measures, they may use them nonetheless to 
ensure the integrity of their works and attribution of their efforts, and 
enforcement of how their works may be used. Also, educational 
institutions themselves, concerned with a return on investment, endorse 
DRM systems.189 As such, rights holders are not the only parties 
responsible for limiting access to digital works.190   
 
The White Paper concludes that the judicial interpretation of the DMCA’s 
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions to exclude fair use and 
other copyright exemptions as defences to actions under the DMCA 
“stripped educational users of their shield against copyright infringement 
liability…”191  
 
                                                 
185 White Paper (n 24) 58. 
186 ibid 60-63. 
187 Much scholarship exists eg S Blythe “The US Digital Millennium Copyright Act and 
the EU Copyright Directive: Comparative Impact on Fair Use” (2006) 8 Tul JTech and 
Intell Prop 111, 129. 
188 White Paper (n 24) 52. 
189 ibid. 54. 
190 Here it is noteworthy that a Creative Commons type licence is used increasingly to 
achieve these means. 
191 White Paper (n 24) s 4.2.4. on Educational Impact. 
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1. LIMITS OF TEACH ACT 
 
The Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2001 
(“TEACH Act”) which promised to update educational use exemptions in 
light of technological developments has not delivered.192 The TEACH Act 
was the product of compromise among the stakeholder community and the 
result of a full study Congress conducted in 1998.193 The TEACH Act: (1) 
expanded the types of content that could be used (2) allowed the 
digitization and short-term retention of content, and (3) eliminated a 
provision in the US copyright legislation that required students to be 
physically on location.  
 
Nonetheless, many strictures make the Act unworkable and unreliable and 
ultimately of little value. While it deals with online learning, it is very 
specific on what may be used without first obtaining permission.194 An 
educational institution must also be not for profit and accredited.  
 
As the White Paper notes, the user must use technological protection 
measures (which often necessitate financial resources) and the actual use 
of technological protection measures “may eviscerate the TEACH Act all 
together.”195 The TEACH ACT “failed to create a safe harbor it promised, 
effectively leaving educations users of digital content without legal 
recourse to make use of such works.”196 The White Paper recommends to 
revise the TEACH ACT.197 
 
                                                 
192 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476. 
193 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School “Digital Learning 
and Legal Background Paper: The TEACH ACT—The Impact of Copyright and 
Compromise on Digital Distance Education” at 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/dl_teachact> (18 June 2007). 
194 R Fry “Copyright Issues in E-learning” (2004) 3:2 Copyright and New Media 
Newsletter. See also <http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/scc/legislative/teachkit/> (19 June 2007) 
195 White Paper (n 24) 34. 
196 ibid. 54. 
197 ibid. 71. 
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And so, as it is not meant to alter fair use, fair use seems to be the 
preferred vehicle of choice in the distance learning environment.198 
Though as explored fair use comes with its own uncertainties. 
 
2. REASONS FOR OPTIMISM: BEST PRACTICES 
 
The White Paper notes some grounds for optimism as (1) it views 
“educational uses” under the fair use doctrine to be likely permissible, and 
(2) there are virtually no decisions that apply fair use directly to 
educational defendants who made educational use of their contents. The 
only cases are those of commercial “coursepack” publishers, but not of the 
teachers making nonprofit educational uses of content.199 A high profile 
case where New York University was the defendant was settled in 1983 
before any decision was reached.200 The White Paper posits that this near-
total absence of lawsuits against educators, “may suggest that rights 
holders have tacitly accepted that the appropriate construction of the fair 
use doctrine leaves significant room for educational uses of content, or 
that they fear a negative public reaction if they sue educators.”201 Indeed, 
some universities encourage that professors rely on the fair use doctrine 
for one-time or first uses of copyrighted material.202 But the cases of 
comfort are limited, and the vast majority of users (from teachers, 
librarians, lawyers and educational administrators) face fear and anxiety 
over acceptable uses of content.203  
 
Some of these stakeholders are trying to clarify the scope of fair use 
through self-help.204 Particularly, stakeholders have come together to 
                                                 
198 NC State University “The TEACT Tool Kit” 
<http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/scc/legislative/teachkit/> (29 June 2007) 
199 White Paper (n 24) 38. 
200 ibid. 
201 ibid. 
202 ibid. for comment by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
203 ibid. 39. 
204 Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use (Center for Social 
Media American University November 18, 2005) 9-10. 
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establish best practices at the university and industry-specific levels.  The 
most successful and comprehensive initiative is a recent one from the 
documentary film-makers’ industry.205 Diverse stakeholders from the 
creators to the producers to the insurers have come together and developed 
a statement on “Best Practices in Fair Use.” This 2005 document has been 
well-received and there is evidence that other industries are following 
suit.206 These initiatives are most promising since clarification, 
understanding and respect for copyright use, creation and dissemination 
will best occur at the grass-roots level. Parties directly involved in the 
industry and therefore presumably more knowledgeable can formulate best 
practices. As in the film-makers’ case, the insurers who will have been 
involved in this consensus-building can then confidently “sign off” and 
generate more possibilities for a greater variety of works for the public.  
These best practices can be thus applied by the creators to insurers of 
copyright and, eventually, as interpretive aids by the judges in the courts 
in the benefit of the public at large.   
 
In the US, attempts to agree on industry-wide guidelines for fair use have 
failed. The most prominent example was the Commission on Fair Use 
(CONFU) which met regularly throughout the 1990s.207 This ambitious 
attempt at a blanket approach indicates that more tailor-made cultural-
specific solutions are necessary and attainable for fair use of copyrighted 
works. 
 
V. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
 
While Canada and the UK appear to have a more rigid “fair dealing” 
framework, and the US a more flexible structure, the results of what has 
been generally considered fair dealing/fair use have been on the most part 
                                                 
205 ibid. 
206 Harvard Internet & Society Conference “Knowledge Beyond Authority” (Harvard 
University June 1 2007) <http://www.is2k7.org/working-groups> 
207 Internationally, the International Federation of Libraries Associations has also looked 
at issue; see generally http://www.ifla.org/ (29 June 2007). 
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similar. 208 David Vaver argues that even before CCH, Canadian courts 
applied similar criteria, the only difference was that fair use may have 
applied to any situation, not merely one enumerated.209 Today, unlike the 
UK, Canada’s enumerated grounds are no longer rigid. CCH has expanded 
Canada’s purposes since these should not be given restrictive 
interpretation. With respect to the criteria, while the US has a statutorily 
entrenched four-factor approach (but with some other factors that have 
been considered, eg monopolistic practices, industry custom) CCH has 
considered six factors with these more or less serving as a future guiding 
framework. It is expected that other unnamed factors may be considered in 
future cases. In other words, the Canadian factors can now be seen as more 
flexible than those in the US.  For the UK, criteria has emerged from the 
caselaw consonant to Canada’s pre-CCH framework, and in many ways 
there is now a hierarchy.  
 
A. HIERARCHY OF FACTORS, NOT NUMBER OF FACTORS 
 
The jurisdictional differences are apparent in the type of factors given 
more weight, and not entirely in the number of factors named. Or put 
differently, examining the hierarchy of factors, as existent in the UK, 
reveals the courts’ approach. A useful exercise is to revisit the CCH 
factors compared to those considered in the US and UK.  
 
While the character, amount, effect and alternatives of the dealing (CCH 
factors 2, 3, 4, 6) are similar in each jurisdiction, the purpose and nature of 
the work (CCH factors 1 and 5) contain some differences.  
 
1. PURPOSE (AND COMMERCIAL NATURE OF THE DEALING) 
 
                                                 
208 Eg fair dealing/fair use was used exonerate newspapers for using third party 
photographs to illustrate a news story: Allen (n 33) and Nunez (n 163) but course-book 
compilers have been liable for reproducing journal articles and book chapters: Boudreau 
(n 33); Princeton University Press v Michigan Document Services 99 F3d 1381 (6th Cir 
1996). 
209 Vaver (n 6) 150. 
2007] HEALING FAIR DEALING? 49 
 
 
 
The purpose of the dealing (and its commercial nature) is the factor that 
seems to be most undermined in CCH, yet most pronounced in the UK (as 
being on the top of the hierarchy, indeed commercial is only allowed in 
review and criticism) and one of four significant factors in the US.  
 
2. NATURE OF THE WORK 
 
Each jurisdiction considers this factor, except that CCH has now curiously 
pronounced the opposite holding: if a work is unpublished it weighs in 
favour of fair dealing. In the UK and the US, if a work is unpublished it 
weighs against fair dealing. This interpretation reveals in particular the 
court’s penchant to favour users.  
 
The role of other factors that were considered pre-CCH in Canada, and are 
currently key factors in the US and UK, is questionable. For instance, the 
role of bad faith was not present in CCH, arguably as there was none. Still 
this was not highlighted expressly as a potential factor. This silence does 
not mean that it cannot feature in future cases – as the factors were more 
or less six.  
 
 
B. OTHER FACTORS 
 
The real differences lie in the policy preoccupations held by the respective 
courts. In Canada, it is clear that the shift is one championing the rights of 
users to “balance” copyright. Though as noted, it is not at all clear where 
the creators fit in this schema, and further, creators are repeatedly 
conflated with right holders. This could not be further from the realities of 
copyright practices. Perhaps in the UK since commercial exploitation is at 
the fore of judicial concern one can argue that right holder interests are 
paramount. In the US, the pendulum swings back and forth among the 
various stakeholders. At bottom, it is difficult to regulate these policy 
preoccupations with certainty. The most effective regulator may be the 
public climate (as has been the case in Canada in advancing user rights) 
and corresponding best practices that need to be articulated.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
An obvious question at this late stage is to ask whether Canada’s fair 
dealing is ill? While perhaps not ill, fair dealing in Canada may have the 
common cold or, may have been ill and is now in convalescence. So while 
surgery may not be necessary some attention may be due. Potential 
remedies become apparent and (in the spirit of CCH) there may be others 
that are worth considering, not noted below. 
 
A. DO NOTHING? 
 
Doing nothing would involve waiting to see other cases apply CCH and 
industry and the Canadian general public muddling about trying to find 
their own way through allowable uses. Sanctioning this copyright 
convalescence does not seem to be an appropriate response. Indeed, 
legislative initiatives for other copyright matters are presently under 
serious consideration (eg technological protection measures which may 
affect fair dealing). Arguably, these initiatives will make copyright more 
expansionist than it already is. Further, there remains a high degree of 
uncertainty in the varying copyright sectors, such as the educational 
sector. In the US, the uncertainty in the educational fair use has very 
recently led to the Copyright Clearance Center offering blanket licences 
for academic institutions.210 However, there are strong arguments to 
suggest that this may not be the way forward.211 
 
B. LEGISLATE CCH FACTORS?  
 
                                                 
210 Copyright Clearance Center “Copyright Clearance Center Announces Annual 
Copyright License for Academia” 
<http://www.copyright.com/ccc/viewPage.do?pageCode=au143> (22 June 2007). 
211 eg such licences could undermine the very purpose of fair use by requiring licensing 
for materials already freely available under statute. Poor institutions may also be 
disadvantaged: J Boyle “The Inefficiencies of Freedom” Financial Times (1 July 2007) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/25cf260c-265c-11dc-8e18-000b5df10621.html>   
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It has been suggested that government intervene and legislate the CCH 
factors. It is not clear how this would be done since the court was clear 
that there are more or less six. More importantly, why would this be done? 
What Canada now has is a flexible framework to evaluate fair dealing on a 
case by case basis based on the ethos that users have rights. This seems 
fairly clear and will be applied and adapted to future cases, in the common 
law way. The fair dealing enumerated purposes can be interpreted in the 
same fashion. CCH has set a strong precedent and unless Parliament 
disagrees with any of its pronouncements it seems inopportune to 
intervene at this time. Legislating CCH may invite even more confusion.  
 
C. CHERRY-PICK OTHER LAWS? 
 
Some commentators have championed that Canada adopt US fair use. This 
would entail “cherry-picking” from the US cadre of copyright laws and 
taking from it its fair use provision. There are problems with this 
approach. First, as noted from eminent US studies, fair use is “ill” and not 
the panacea approach that many, perhaps in Canada, proclaim. Because 
fair use is ill, it has by necessity engendered many fix-it approaches, some 
by the courts themselves attempting to impose bright-lines (eg 
presumptions on commercial uses) and by industry players attempting to 
institute best practices. Second, cherry-picking a law, likely also means 
taking from its jurisprudence (and neglecting other constitutive factors, 
such as a Constitution). Would Canadian courts apply US fair use cases? 
Would this application ignore the fact that property is not constitutionally 
entrenched in Canada? Singapore has cherry-picked US fair use, however 
its courts are reluctant to consider US fair use cases causing much 
disorder. This approach would cause more perplexity than currently exists. 
One must be very careful when importing legal devices from other 
jurisdictions.  
 
In this context, it is also useful to consider whether fair dealing 
necessitates clarification to encompass important (and new) uses. In the 
UK, Gowers recommended that the government should enact a new 
copyright exception for parody. Before CCH many scholars posited that 
parodies would be infringing in Canada. Post CCH’s liberal interpretation 
of the enumerated grounds, it could be argued that “criticism” could now 
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encompass parody. Michelin no longer seems good law. Indeed, parody in 
the US is not an automatic. Parody still requires analysis of each of the 
four factors as well as some use of the target to be fair.212 This can now 
also be the case in Canada and would likely not require any legislative 
intervention. 
 
Similarly, time-shifting that comports with fair dealing criteria could now 
be allowed in Canada, as it has long been in the US.  In the UK, Gowers is 
again recommending a copyright exception but for format-shifting. With 
respect to Crown copyright, CCH clarifies that the copying of judicial 
decisions is permissible and it is likely that other government works used 
in a similar fashion would also be.213 Still, in Canada because of Crown 
copyright more work is subject to protection, which is not the case in the 
US but very much the reality in the UK and there are no plans in that 
country to address this. This issue may require more consideration. 
 
In the ambit of the educational sector, while questionable as to whether 
specific provisions, even amending fair dealing (such as adding 
‘educational uses’ as an enumerated ground), are useful or even necessary, 
it does seem apparent that clarification (and not necessarily of the legal 
type) is critical across the various sectors. One disadvantage of introducing 
a new law is that it may take time before the quick fix that is sought is 
achieved and may never be achieved. New practices will develop to likely 
test the limits of the new law through more court cases, thereby inviting 
access to justice issues for the more disadvantaged parties. And so, if 
clarity is the goal it is unclear that it can be attained in the immediate 
future in this way.  
 
D. FAIR DEALING BEST PRACTICES?  
 
Rather than (or at least complimentary to) reforming the law, fair dealing 
best practices are most promising. The parties directly affected in a 
                                                 
212 Dr Seuss Enterprises LP v Penguin Books USA 109 F3d 1394 (9th Cir 1997) upheld a 
preliminary injunction, ruling against fair use. see also Carroll (n 173) 28. 
213 Though CCH, suggests that photocopying the decision itself are not subject to 
copyright, decisions with headnotes, summaries are.  
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specific industry can together develop these guidelines which can 
ultimately aid in fair dealing decision-making in the courts. There have 
already been successful guidelines or best practices generated in the US 
where stakeholders with apparent disparate interests in the documentary 
film-making sector have devised fair use best practices. The interest is also 
apparent internationally and locally, though from a common set of 
stakeholder interests (eg within universities and libraries in both Canada 
and the US). In Canada, most educational institutions have devised 
copyright policies to deal with the use of copyrighted materials by its 
patrons. The Great Library of Toronto continues to have one.214 Osgoode 
Hall Law School and York University have developed a policy.215 
Concordia University has a policy (which appends the Copyright Act) and 
has also struck working groups to study these issues.216 Indeed, libraries 
continue to play an important role in the negotiation, implementation, and 
managing of licences. Staff are asked to regularly enforce and interpret 
copyright issues for compliance.217 These are promising starts, but more 
concerted industry efforts as spearheaded by the US documentary film-
makers can and should be emulated.  
 
 
More parties with conflicting interests within a set sector need to come 
together. As noted, this can clarify fair dealing uses for all from the 
creators, users, right holders to the courts, who can then rely on these 
standards as “soft law” when interpreting fair dealing cases. These 
initiatives can and should be encouraged to flourish and will at worst, help 
foster communication and dialogue among different parties. But the 
benefits can be far more reaching and consequential to future fair dealing 
(and general) copyright practices. CCH favours parties that abide by their 
                                                 
214 Great Library, LSUC “Access to the Law Policy and Guidelines” 
<http://library.lsuc.on.ca/GL/services_access.htm> (29 June 2007) 
215 York University “Copyright” 
<http://www.yorku.ca/secretariat/senate/committees/lit/copyright/Copyright%20and%20
You.pdf> (29 June 2007) 
216 Concordia University “Policy on Copyright Compliance” (February 28, 2001) 
<http://web2.concordia.ca/Legal_Counsel/policies/english/SG/SG-2.html> (19 June 
2007) 
217 see LE Harris “Editorial” (2004) 8(3) Copyright and New Media Law Newsletter . 
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institutional access policies, their case could be more persuasive if such 
policies were consistent across their industry. Such context specific 
guidelines should be developed to ensure that all parties are compliant 
with copyright and in healthy agreement.  
 
 
E. CLARIFY COPYRIGHT ACT? CLARIFY POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
 
Just as one cannot cherry-pick laws from other countries, it is difficult to 
cherry-pick problems and solve problems within the Canadian copyright 
system. Fair dealing cannot be addressed in a vacuum. One must revisit 
the entire CCA and study what its objectives are, where the balance is 
being struck. Are right holders the so-called winning parties? Whose 
interests is copyright law meant to serve?  
 
As noted in various parts of this paper, the question remains where is the 
author/creator? CCH does not appear to account for her. The Copyright 
Board has also flagged this oversight. In the current Canadian judiciary, 
public and academic copyright climate, creators’ “rights”, if one can still 
use the two words together, le droit d’auteur, seems to be a term of the 
past or one romanticized and stuck within the civilian tradition and 
vanishing from the Canadian common law tradition.218 Creators remain 
subject to industry power imbalances which are facilitated by the CCA 
(allowing freedom of contract and in practice favouring right holders) and 
facilitated by the courts (undermining creators, but championing another 
stakeholder previously ill-addressed, the users). Author-centric provisions 
may thus be necessary (accounting for the role of contract and moral 
rights) to balance liberalized fair dealing and potential future exceptions 
and right holder centric existing provisions. In this context, as an example 
of eschewing a fragmented fix-it approach, addressing the issue of the 
various types of damages available and the requisite levels of proof is also 
an important matter and needs consideration in light of the different types 
of infringement and infringers.   
 
                                                 
218 This was not always the case: D’Agostino En attendant Robertson (n 18). 
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And when all is said and done, if copyright balance is found, the next 
more important question is whether the CCA is clear enough to 
communicate this balance. Are the CCA’s objectives embraced by the 
practices of stakeholders, the courts and so on? One hindrance may be the 
lack of clarity in the CCA. Simplifying and clarifying the CCA was 
flagged as a long term priority in the Section 92 Report and should not to 
be forgotten in the short term.  
 
 
 
